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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT OF

RELiGION-The United States Supreme Court held that a state
law creating a public school district for a village, whose boundaries had been drawn to include only members of a religious
sect, violates the First Amendment by delegating political authority to a group defined by its religious character.
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
The Village of Kiryas Joel (the "Village") in New York State is
home to over 8,500 members of an ultraorthodox Jewish sect
known as the Satmar Hasidim.1 The Village traced its roots to
the mid-seventies, when the Satmar Hasidim began relocating to
a subdivision they had purchased in the town of Monroe.' After
clashing with the town over zoning laws,' the Satmar Hasidim
used New York's Village Law4 to petition the Town Board of
Monroe to create a new village within the town.'
The sect's religious schools,6 however, were unable to provide

1. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2485 (1994). The Satmar Hasidim lead their lives in strict adherence to the
Torah and avoid assimilation into the greater American society around them. Kiryas
Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. They are distinguished by their use of Yiddish as their
primary language and by distinctive dress. Id. They educate their children in private
religious schools, segregating the sexes. Id. The sect originated in the early part of
the twentieth century and consisted of followers of the Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum
in the town of Satmar, along the Hungarian-Romanian border. Id. In the aftermath
of World War II, the Grand Rebbe and his surviving followers moved to Brooklyn,
New York. Id.
2. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. Monroe is located in Orange County, New
York. Id. at 2484.
3. Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In areas zoned for single-family use,
the Satmar Hasidim subdivided homes into several apartments and used basements
in synagogues and schools to house religious followers. Id. This traditional practice
accommodated members of the extended family. Id.
4. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw, §§ 2-200 to 2-258 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1994).
These sections of the Village Law outline the necessary procedures and requirements
for inhabitants to incorporate as a village. Id. These sections describe requirements
regarding population and area as well as petition and election procedures. Id.
5. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. In a negotiated settlement, the parties
drew the boundaries of the Village to include only the 320 acres owned and occupied
entirely by the Grand Rebbe's followers. Id.
6. Most boys were educated at the United Talmudic Academy, while most
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services for the special needs of handicapped children.7 State'
and federal' laws mandate the provision for the special educa-

tion needs of handicapped children even when enrolled in private

schools. 10 To this end, the Monroe-Woodbury

Central

School District ("Monroe-Woodbury") began to provide services
for the sect's handicapped students at an annex to one of the
Satmar Hasidim's religious schools in 1984." In 1985, MonroeWoodbury discontinued its services."' Children from the Village
who needed special education had to travel to the public schools
in Monroe. 3 The parents viewed this as highly unsatisfactory
because the Hasidic children were distinguished from the other
children in the public school by language and culture."

By 1989, only one handicapped child from the Village was
enrolled in a public school in the Monroe-Woodbury school system, while the other handicapped children received no services
at all or received privately funded services. 5 The territory of
the Village remained part of Monroe-Woodbury until 1989, when
the New York State Legislature (the "Legislature") passed a
special state statute, referred to as Chapter 748,"6 creating a

girls received instruction at Bais Rochel. Id.
7. Id. The sect's handicapped children suffered from a range of physical, mental or emotional disorders, including deafness and mental retardation. Id.
8. N.Y. EDUC. LAW, art. 89 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994).
9. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988
& Supp. 1994).
10. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
11. Id.
12. Id. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In both Aguilar and Ball, the Supreme Court held
that the use of federal funds to pay public school teachers who provided remedial
services at private schools was a violation of the Establishment Clause. See Aguilar,
473 U.S. at 412; Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. The similarities between these cases and the
practice used in Monroe-Woodbury prompted the district to withdraw its teachers
from the annex in the Village. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
13. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
14. Id. In Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District v.
Wieder, Hasidic parents of handicapped children argued that the public schools were
inappropriate "because of the panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their own community and being with people whose ways were so different from
theirs." Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d
767, 770 (N.Y. 1988).
15. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
16. 1989 N.Y. Laws 748. The statute, entitled "AN ACT to establish a separate school district in and for the village of Kiryas Joel, Orange county," provided
that:
Section 1. The territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel in the Town of
Monroe, Orange County, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be
and hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the
Kiryas Joel Village School District and shall have and enjoy all of the powers
and duties a union free school district under provisions of the Education Law.
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union free school district" with boundaries coterminous with
those of the Village." Though empowered with the full authority of a school district, the Kiryas Joel Village School District (the
"District") only provided special education services for handicapped children. 9
Shortly before the District initiated its programs, the New
York State School Boards Association and two of its officers,
Louis Grumet and Albert W. Hawk, in their capacities as officials and as taxpayers (the "Appellees"), filed suit against the
New York State Education Department and various state officials.2" The suit challenged the constitutionality of Chapter 748
under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution' and the New York Constitution.2
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and

§ 2. Such district shall be under the control of a board of education, which
shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the qualified voters
of the village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for terms not exceeding
five years. § 3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law.
1989 N.Y. Laws 748.
17. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1709 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994). The law describes
the organization of the district and the board of education and prescribes the scope
of powers of such a district. Id.
18. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
19. Id. By arrangement with Monroe-Woodbury, the District was to send any
non-handicapped children from the Village to a public school in Monroe or some
other nearby district. Id.
20. Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992), affd, Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992), affd Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), affd Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). The state officials included Thomas Sobol, Commissioner of the New York State Education Department, and Edward V. Regan, New
York State Comptroller. Grumet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. The Kiryas Joel Village
School District and the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District were not named as
defendants in the original complaint. Id. at 1006.
21. Id. The First Amendment provides in part, that, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

22. Grumet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1006. The New York Constitution prohibits the
state's subdivisions from using public money to aid or maintain religious schools.
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
By stipulation and order, the action was discontinued as to the state defendants after the state supreme court for Albany County granted the motions to intervene as defendants made by the Kiryas Joel Village School District and MonroeWoodbury (the "Appellants"). Grumet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1006. On behalf of the state
defendants, the Attorney General of New York continued as a party to defend the
constitutionality of Chapter 748. Id. (citing N.Y. Exgc. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1993)).
This statute provides that the attorney general may be permitted to appear at any
proceeding that challenges the constitutionality of a state statute. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
71.
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the trial court ruled for the Appellees, finding that Chapter 748
was an unconstitutional establishment of religion and violated
all three parts of the test outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.' The Appellate Division of New
York State Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on
the ground that Chapter 748 violated the second part of the
Lemon test in that it had the primary effect of advancing reli-

gion.24 The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed on the feder-

al constitutional question and did not reach the state constitutional question.25 The Appellants subsequently appealed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari."' The issue addressed by the Supreme
Court was whether Chapter 748 violated the Establishment
Clause by allocating civil authority on the basis of a religious
criterion.27
The Supreme Court, with Justice Souter writing for the plurality initially and for the majority in the later parts," began
by noting that the Establishment Clause required government to
exercise neutrality in its relationship with religious organizations.' The plurality held that Chapter 748 violated this command by vesting political authority over public schools in a

23. Grumet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1007 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971)). In Lemon, the United States Supreme Court developed a three-part test to
be applied in the evaluation of governmental actions under the Establishment
Clause. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon test requires that: "lflirst, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' ".Id. (citations omitted).
24. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d
123, 126-27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), affd Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), affd Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
25. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94,
101 (N.Y. 1993), affd Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). The New York Court of Appeals did not address the state
constitutional issue because the courts below did not separately discuss the two constitutional provisions, and the parties concentrated on the First Amendment in their
arguments. Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 101.
26. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 544
(1993).
27. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
28. Joining Justice Souter in the plurality were Justices Blacknun, Stevens,
and Ginsburg. Id. at 2495. Justice O'Connor concurred in part, joining Justice
Souter's opinion to create a majority as to Parts I-B, I-C, and III. Id. at 2497
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment. Id. at
2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing Committee for Public Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
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group defined by its religious composition." In support of this,
the plurality relied on Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,31 in which
the Court held that a statute vesting discretionary state authority in a religious body was an impermissible entanglement of
government and religion. 2
Next the plurality asserted that while Chapter 748 was a
more subtle violation of the Establishment Clause than the
statute in Larkin, it was nevertheless an impermissible entanglement.3 3 The Court found that vesting power in a secular organization dominated by members of the sect instead of in the
religious organization was a difference only of form, not substance.34 Citing two factors, the plurality held that the Satmar
Hasidim received special treatment in the creation of the District.35 First, creating a small school district did not fit the
trend in New York state toward fewer and larger school districts.36 Second, the District was created by a special act of the
Legislature instead of by the general laws of the State.3 7 The
plurality concluded that the District, as a reflection of the homogeneous nature of the Village's population, had been created and
vested with civil authority on the basis of a religious test in
violation of the Establishment Clause."8
After the plurality found a violation of the Establishment
Clause,39 a majority of the Court expressed concern that the

30. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487.
31. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). The statute at issue in Larkin allowed a religious institution, upon written objection, to intervene to prevent the issuance of a liquor
license within 500 feet of the institution's premises. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117.
32. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2488 (citing Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126). The
Larkin Court found that the statute at issue was an impermissible entanglement
because the "statute enmeshes churches in the exercise of substantial governmental
powers contrary to our consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause."
Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126.
33. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2489.
34. Id. The Court noted that while Chapter 748 did not expressly delegate authority according to religious criteria, the Legislature was aware that the Village's
boundaries were drawn to exclude all but Satmar Hasidim. Id. at 2489 (citing
Appellant's Brief, at 20, Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 93-517), and Appellee's
Brief, at 11, Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 93-517)).
35. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2489-90.
36. Id. at 2489.
37. Id. at 2490. The Appellants argued that the Legislature had created at
least twenty small school districts by special acts, but the Court distinguished the
instant case because the District had its own tax base and student population. Id.
These other school districts were created to be run by private organizations which
would accept placements of children from school districts and public agencies. Id.
None had geographical boundaries or separate tax bases. Id.
38. Id.
39. In this part of the opinion, Justice O'Connor joined Justice Souter to create a majority. Id. at 2495.
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Legislature would not be able to ensure that other groups would
receive the same special treatment given to the Satmar Hasidim. 0 The case-specific nature of the act of the Legislature appeared to lack neutrality, while leaving the impression that the
government was expressing a preference for one religion over all
others." The majority stated that it was a well-grounded principle that any benefit provided to religious organizations had to
be available on an equal basis to all religious groups.42 The majority concluded that because the benefit flowed to a specific religious group with no assurance of governmental neutrality, the
State of New York had violated the Establishment Clause.'
In the next section of the opinion, the Court acknowledged
that the principle of accommodating the needs of religious
groups was constitutionally sound.' The Court reaffirmed that
the command of neutrality did not require government to ignore
the burdens its actions could place on religion and religious
practices."5 Noting that there were limits to the principle of
accommodation, the Court maintained that Chapter 748 was
unconstitutional not for facilitating religious practice, but because it delegated political authority to a religious group."
The final section of the majority opinion 7 was followed by
40. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.
41. Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); and School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 216-17 (1963)).
42. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
673 (1970)). In Walz, the Court allowed property tax exemptions to remain for properties owned by religious groups becausb no one group was singled out. Walz, 397
U.S. at 696-97. The exemption was available to a broad range of non-profit organizations. Id.
43. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2492.
44. Id. The Court noted that the state could intervene to remove special burdens because "government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious
practices and . . . may do so without violating the Establishment Clause." Id. (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)).
45. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2492 (citing Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)). In
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, the Court held that religious employers were exempt from Title VII of the-Civil Rights Act of 1964 and could favor their own adherents in hiring, even for secular positions. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 483
U.S. at 335-36.
46. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2492-93. Justice Souter suggested that the Hasidic children could have received bilingual and bicultural instruction through Monroe-Woodbury, either at a public school or at a neutral site near one of the Village
schools, without violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2493.
47. Id. In the final section, the Court criticized the views expressed in the
dissenting opinion. See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Scalia in the dissent were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
Id. The Court criticized the dissenters for what was characterized as their antiquated view of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2494. Intimating that the dissent's view
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Stevens,4

O'Connor" and Kennedy.' Concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that
Chapter 748 went beyond accommodation because it conferred
favorable treatment on a particular religious group.52 Justice

O'Connor indicated that the Court should abandon its search for
a general theory to be applied in all religion cases, typified by

the Lemon test, and resolve such disputes on a case-by-case
basis.' Justice O'Connor contended that a unitary approach
was ill-suited to addressing unique concerns raised by new problems.'
While concurring with the Court that Chapter 748 discrimi-

nated among religious groups and violated the Establishment
Clause, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Court's contention
that the Legislature would not be able to ensure a neutral treat-

ment of all religious groups seeking special legislative acts.55
Justice Kennedy argued that a legislature should be free to
respond to unique burdens placed on particular religious
groups.5" Justice Kennedy was persuaded that, while the Legis-

lature had rightly sought to remove special burdens on the

Satmar Hasidim, it had gone beyond accommodation by drawing
political boundaries on the basis of religious faith.57
was not that of the Framers of the Constitution or the Court throughout its history,
the majority opinion argued that Justice Scalia wished to narrow the Establishment
Clause to a few simple rules. Id. The Court argued that the dissenters did not recognize the command of neutrality whenever government had contact with religion or
religious groups. Id.
48. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun stated that he wrote separately in order to express his support of the
principles enunciated in Lemon. Id.
49. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Ginsburg, suggested that Chapter 748 went beyond the principle of
accommodation because it segregated children on the basis of religion, which was in
opposition to the public interest of diversity and understanding. Id. This concurrence
stated that instead of isolating the Satmar children, the State should strive to instill
the principle of tolerance in the children attending public schools. Id. Justice Stevens
was persuaded that whenever government lent its support to the indoctrination of
young adherents, it had moved beyond accommodation and into the establishment of
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
50. Id. at 2495 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 2499-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2499. In fact, Justice O'Connor called for the reconsideration of
Aguilar, which prohibited public school teachers from providing remedial services in
parochial schools. Id. at 2498 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
55. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2500-01.
56. Id. at 2501.
57. Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that he lamented the use of the Establishment Clause to prohibit the
accommodation of a small religious sect."8 The dissent contended that the Court's first argument, which centered on the unconstitutionality of vesting governmental authority in a religious
group, was based on a misreading of Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc. 9 The dissent opined that the Court had failed to distinguish between civil authority held directly by a church and civil
authority held by individuals who incidentally were members of
a church."
The dissent also contended that the Court's second argument,
that the Satmar Hasidim received special treatment by the creation of the District, was flawed.8 ' First, the dissent argued
that the creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District by a
special act of the Legislature was not extraordinary.62 Second,
the dissent contended that the Court's argument that the creation of the District ran counter to the trend toward larger
school districts was not true.' The dissent contended that the
Court's argument that the District included only Satmar Hasidim and therefore favored one religion, was illogical.'
The dissent then argued that even if Chapter 748 gave special
treatment to the Satmar Hasidim on the basis of their religion,
this would still be a permissible accommodation. 5 Justice
Scalia cited a line of cases to support his contention that accomO'Connor that Ball and Aguilar may have been wrongly decided and should be reconsidered. Id.
58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the plurality's arguments as
twofold: first, providing the District with governmental authority was the same as
giving such power to a religious group, and second, the Legislature was favoring the
religion of the Satmar Hasidim over all others. Id. at 2507.
59. Id.
60. Id. The dissent contended that such a failure ignored much of the history
of the United States, in which co-religionists set out to create homogeneous communities. Id. By the majority's standard, the dissent argued, the creation of the State
of Utah was unconstitutional, given that state's predominately Mormon population.
Id. The dissent also cited McDaniel v. Paty, in which the Court struck down a statute prohibiting a member of the clergy from holding public office. Id. at 2508 (citing
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)). In McDaniel, the Court held that it was a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause to bar a citizen from participating in the political process on the basis of religious affiliation. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628-29.
61. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2508-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2509. The dissent cited several examples of the Legislature creating
other school districts by special act. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2510. Justice Scalia contended that special treatment was not proof
of religious favoritism. Id.
65. Id. at 2511. Justice Scalia regarded the District as a secular governmental
entity, whose population base just happened to be a homogeneous group of religious
adherents. Id. at 2506.
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modation of religion had been a long-standing American tradition.66 Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's contention that
there was no guarantee that the Legislature would offer accommodation to other religious groups. 7 The dissent argued that it
was the nature of accommodation to address the problems of a
single religious group, making a neutral system of assurances
impossible."
The dissent concluded that the opinion cited Lemon only
twice, even though the decisions below relied on its test. 9 Justice Scalia, taking issue with Justice O'Connor's promotion of
-situation-specific rules, ended by advocating that Lemon be
abandoned because its application has left it without meaning.7" The dissent asserted that the Court's Establishment
Clause cases had had the effect of abrogating the country's religious tradition.7
The First Amendment prevents the federal government from
passing laws establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.72 In 1947, the Supreme Court first considered
whether a state statute implicated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment in Everson v. Board of Education.7 3 The
Court briefly reviewed the historical background leading to the
adoption of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.74 The
Court noted that the centuries prior to the founding of the United States were marked by turmoil generated by established
religious sects in Europe attempting to hold on to absolute political power.7" The Court noted that while religious minorities
sought refuge from persecution in the American colonies, mem66. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987); Corporation
for Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); and Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
67. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2515. The parties used significant portions of their briefs to expound
on Lemon. Id. See note 163 for a discussion of the parties' arguments.
70. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
asserted that the Court had applied the Lemon test in a variety of cases to achieve
whatever result it wanted. Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) and
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
71. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2515-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held
that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were made applicable to the
states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
73. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-11.
75. Id. at 8-9.
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bers of the religious majorities were also transplanted, bringing
with them many of worst religious traditions of the old world.70
The Court asserted that these practices shocked some leading
colonial figures into opposing the established churches.77 The
Court reasoned that the First Amendment was adopted to
achieve the same objectives of prohibiting the establishment of
religion, while leaving citizens free to follow their individual
consciences.79
In Everson, the Court addressed the issue of whether a New
Jersey statute providing for public transportation to and from
both public and parochial schools was a violation of the Establishment Clause.7" While noting that the First Amendment required a state to be neutral in its relationships with religious
organizations, the Court observed that this did not mean that a
state had to be hostile to religion."0 The Court determined that
the actions of a state had to remain within the rather broad
boundaries of the First Amendment, which prohibited a state
from supporting a particular church as well as burdening the
free exercise of religion.8' The Court held that religious groups
were entitled to benefits from public welfare legislation, which
included safe transportation to school and police protection."
In Engel v. Vitale,' the Court first considered the question of
whether a government-composed prayer recited in a public
school violated the Establishment Clause. The Court observed
76. Id. at 9-10. The Court stated that the English Crown granted charters
authorizing individuals and land companies to establish churches requiring financial
support from the general population. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 11. In Virginia, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson led the movement against the established church, opposing a tax levy on all citizens for support.
Id. at 11-12. Their efforts culminated in the enactment of the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty." Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3-4. The board of education reimbursed parents for
the cost of sending their children to school on buses operated by the public transportation system. Id. at 3. Some of the money went to parents who sent their children to Catholic parochial schools. Id.
80. Id. at 18. The Court noted that under the state's compulsory education
laws, parents were free to send their children to religious schools as long as such
schools met certain secular education requirements. Id.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 17. Such legislation could include public transportation, police and
fire protection, and use of public amenities like sewage systems, sidewalks, and
highways. Id. at 17-18.
83. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
84. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422-24. The prayer was composed by the state board of
regents, which had been granted extensive legislative and executive powers concerning the administration of public schools by the state legislature Id. at 422-23. On
the recommendation of the board, a school district instructed its principal to read
the following prayer at the beginning of each school day: "Almighty God, we ac-
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that the Establishment Clause was included in the First Amendment as a precaution against the intermingling of governmental
authority and religious doctrine.' Therefore, the Court reasoned, government was without power to prescribe the content of
a prayer or otherwise sponsor a religious activity." The Court
observed that even a voluntary, non-denominational prayer was
invalid because the purpose of the Establishment Clause was to
prevent both coercive and non-coercive encroachments on religious freedom.87 The Court added that its decision was not to
be interpreted as in any way hostile to religion and concluded
that the First Amendment was designed to end governmental
control of religion."
A year later, the Court decided a similar issue when it considered whether a state law requiring schools to begin each day
with a Bible reading was a violation of the Establishment
Clause.8" In School District v. Schempp, ° the Court stated
that the Establishment Clause and the cases interpreting the
Clause required governmental neutrality and prohibited official
support for any religious group.9 ' The Court asserted that a
statute should be tested on the basis of its purpose and effect.92
The Court reasoned that a legislative body had overstepped its
knowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
85. Id. at 429. The Court began its historical overview with a discussion of

the relationship between the English Parliament and its enactment of the Book of
Common Prayer in 1548. Id. at 425-27. According to the Court, the dominance of
the Church of England and its persecution of dissenting denominations led to an
exodus to the American colonies. Id. at 427. Although state churches were estab-

lished in some colonies, small religious groups in Virginia like the Presbyterians,
Lutherans, Quakers, and Baptists, aided by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson,
were able to obtain the passage of the Virginia Bill of Religious Liberty. Id. at 428.
The Court observed that this historical experience was the antecedent of the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment. Id. at 429.

86. Id. at 430.
87. Id. at 430-33. The Court noted that coercion was not an element in determining whether a government action violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 43031.
88. Id. at 433-35.
89. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). A
consolidation of two actions, Schempp involved state laws requiring readings from
the Bible at the beginning of each school day. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205.

90. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
91. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. In support of the notion of neutrality, the
Court cited Zorach u. Clauson and noted that there could never be a complete separation of church and state and that the Establishment Clause only prohibited a
union or dependency. Id. at 219-20 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952)).

92.

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. This case formed the basis for the secular

purpose part of the Lemon test. See notes 103-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lemon.
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power if the enactment of such a statute advanced or inhibited
religion.9 3 The Court held that the religious nature of the readings a*s well as the law making the readings mandatory were a
violation of the Establishment Clause because the law had no
secular purpose."
In Walz v. Tax Commission,5 the issue before the Court was
whether state tax exemptions for real property owned by religious organizations violated the prohibition of establishing religion." The Court asserted that the inclusion of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the Constitution required a
degree of interaction between government and religion and that
it was the role of the judiciary to delineate between unavoidable
entanglement and open hostility. 7 The Court was satisfied that
the language of the statute did not favor the properties of a
particular faith or even churches generally, but included a range
of properties owned by groups exerting positive influences in
local communities.9"
After determining that it was not the aim of the legislature to
sponsor religion, the Court next examined the effect of the statute." The Court pointed out that the issue of taxation of
churches necessarily involved entanglement regardless of how
the Court chose to resolve the issue.' ° Thus, the Court held

93. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
94. Id. at 223. The Schempp decision was applied in Board of Education v.
Allen. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Allen, the Court considered the issue of whether a statute requiring public school districts to purchase and
lend books to students attending religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.
Allen, 392 U.S. at 238. The Court examined the legislative purpose of the statute
and found that it was for the secular purpose of furthering educational opportunities. Id. at 243. Next, the Court found that the effect of the statute did not advance
religion in contradiction to its purpose. Id. at 243-44. The Court observed that the
books, none of which were religious in nature, were lent to support secular education in parochial schools and did not amount to an endorsement of the religious
instruction given at these schools. Id. at 247-48. In reliance on Everson, the Court in
Allen held that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 238.
Allen formed the basis of the first two parts of the Lemon test. See notes 103-12
and accompanying text for a further discussion of Lemon.
95. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
96. Walz, 397 U.S. at 667. An owner of real estate brought suit, claiming that
the exemption indirectly .forced the owner to contribute to religious entities. Id.
97. Id. at 670.
98. Id. at 672-73. The statute granted tax exemptions to real property owned
by a range non-profit organizations including churches, hospitals, libraries, scientific
and literary societies, cemeteries, and patriotic groups. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §
2
4 0-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994).
99. Walz, 397 U:S. at 674.
100. Id. at 674. The Court pointed out that the elimination of the exemption
would have resulted in increased entanglement by way of tax valuations, tax liens,
foreclosures and all resulting legal proceedings. Id.
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that even though such exemptions bestowed an indirect economic benefit on religious organizations, this was not a violation of
the Establishment Clause because the state was merely abstaining from forcing the church to support the state." 1 Recognizing
the long history of tax exemptions for religious properties, the
Court affirmed the validity of the statute."'
In its next case, the Court developed a test that would define
all subsequent Establishment Clause cases. 0 3 In Lemon V.
Kurtzman,"4 the Court addressed the issue of whether two
state statutes providing state aid to religious schools were an
excessive entanglement between government and religion." 5
The Court applied a three-part test distilled from prior Supreme
Court cases."° First, the Court declared that a legislature had
to have a secular purpose when enacting a statute.' 7 Next, the
Court asserted that the statute's could neither advance nor inhibit religion.' Finally, the Court insisted that the administration of a statute could not excessively entangle government
with religion.'19 The Court noted that both state legislatures
attempted to restrict public aid to the support of secular educational functions.' However, the Court asserted that the administration of the statutes required a degree of involvement
that went beyond the limits specified in Walz."' The Court
held that, by enlarging the involvement of the state in religious
affairs, the statutes were an excessive entanglement violative of
the Establishment Clause." 2

101. Id. at 675.
102. Id. at 680.
103. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
104. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
105. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606. The Rhode Island statute authorized salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects who taught in private religious schools. Id.
at 607. The Pennsylvania statute reimbursed religious schools for expenditures on
books and salaries that went to secular subjects. Id. at 609.
106. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). The Court based the first two prongs on
Allen. Id. at 612 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). The
third prong was based on Wilz. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
107. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 613.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 613-14. The Court asserted that it was impossible to monitor a
teacher's handling of a subject to ensure that instruction was purely secular. Id. at
617. The Court also noted that the Pennsylvania statute provided financial aid directly to the religious schools, unlike earlier cases like Everson and Allen, in which
the financial aid flowed to parents and students. Id. at 621.
112. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. The Court asserted that the innovative nature of
both state programs presented a different problem than the universal practice of tax
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In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' s the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a Massachusetts statute granting
schools and churches the power to prevent the issuance of liquor
licenses to be used at premises located within five hundred feet
of a church or school was a violation of the Establishment
Clause." 4 The Court contended that even the appearance of an
exercise of legislative power by a church violated the Establishment Clause." 5 The Court applied the Lemon test and found
that the statute had excessively entangled government with
religion." 6 The Court held that the statute effectively granted
governmental authority to a religious group, had the primary
effect of advancing religion and excessively entangled government and religion." 7
In Mueller v. Allen,"' the Court considered whether a statute allowing state income tax deductions for private school tuition, books and transportation violated the Establishment
Clause." 9 The Court applied the three-part test enunciated in
Lemon and found that the statute did not violate the test. 2 '
First, the Court found that the secular purpose of the statute
was to ensure the education of the state's children by defraying
educational costs.' 2 ' Second, the Court determined that the
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
because the deduction was available to all parents, including

exemptions for church property that was allowed in Walz. Id. at 624. The Court
noted that both programs were aimed at alleviating the deepening financial crises at
the parochial schools in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island and that the programs, if
not invalidated, would become progressively larger, further impinging on First
Amendment prohibitions. Id. at 623-24.
113. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
114. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117. The statute provided that: "[plremises . . . located
within a radius of five hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for
the sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of such church or school files
written objection thereto." Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 16C (1977)). The
Court noted that the state had the zoning power to regulate areas adjacent to
schools and churches. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 121. The Court opined that the secular
purpose of the statute of restricting liquor stores near churches and schools could
have been achieved by an absolute ban within a prescribed area. Id. at 124.
115. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126-27. The Court found that a church could object for
any reason or no reason at all and that such a power could be used to attain goals
beyond protecting the church from undesirable neighbors, such as favoring its members in the issuance of licenses. Id. at 125.
116. Id. at 127.
117. Id. at 125-26.
118. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
119. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390. Because most of the students sent to non-public
schools attended sectarian schools, the deductions were primarily benefitting religious
groups. Id. at 391.
120. Id. at 394-404.
121. Id. at 394-95.
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those sending their children to public schools' 22 and those
sending their children to private schools, both sectarian and
non-sectarian. 3 Third, the Court reasoned that no entanglement was involved because the private decisions of parents, and
not some state action, conferred the benefit on a particular religion.124 The Court concluded that the statute did not violate
the Establishment Clause.'
In Lynch "v. Donnelly,'26 the issue before the Court was
whether the inclusion of a nativity scene in a Christmas display
erected by a city in a privately-owned park was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.'2 7 The Court defended the creche as a
depiction of the historical origins of what had become a secular
holiday.12 The Court maintained that the religious impact of
the creche was offset by its setting among secular symbols of the
holiday. 2 Applying the Lemon test, the Court was satisfied
that the creche was erected for a secular purpose whose primary
effect did not advance religion or entangle government and religion and thus, did not violate the Establishment Clause. 30
122. Id. at 397. Children who attended a public school outside of their district
were allowed to deduct tuition costs charged by public schools to non-residents. Id.
at 391 n.2.
123. Id. at 397.
124. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403. The Court noted that the role of state officials
was limited to disallowing deductions for religious books and materials. Id. Also, the
Court distinguished this case from Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, which
forbade direct subsidies to parochial schools. Id. at 398 (citing Committee for Public
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 746, 780-83 (1973)).
125. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403-04.
126. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
127. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71.
128. Id. at 680.
129. Id. at 686. According to the Court, the display included:
[M]any of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas,
including, among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's
sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of
colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and the
creche at issue here.
Id. at 671.
130. Id. at 681-85. The dissenting opinion in Lynch also applied the Lemon test
and reached a different conclusion about the constitutionality of the creche. Id. at
694 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that the presence of the creche
violated all three parts of the Lemon test. Id. at 698-704.
In her concurring opinion in Lynch, Justice O'Connor suggested that the
Court clarify its Establishment Clause doctrine. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). From the Court's previous cases, the Justice distilled two principal
ways that government could violate the Establishment Clause. Id. First, government
could become excessively entangled with religion by interfering in religious institutions or by granting access to governmental authority; and second, governmental
endorsement of religion sent a message to adherents that they were favored in the
political process, while non-adherents are made to feel like outsiders. Id. at 687-88.
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In Wallace v. Jaffree,"' the Court again addressed the issue
of whether a state statute allowing for a period of meditation
and prayer in public schools violated the Establishment
Clause. 2 Applying the Lemon test, the Court found that the
legislature had no secular purpose in mind when it enacted the
statute and that the sole purpose was to endorse prayer activities.'33 The Court reasoned that without a secular purpose in
enacting legislation, the government was unable to maintain its
neutrality toward religion.' The Court struck down the statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause because the state
government's action could have been interpreted as an endorsement of religion.'35

Justice O'Connor focused on whether the creche was intended to communicate, and
whether in fact it did communicate, an endorsement of Christianity. Id. at 690-91.
The Justice agreed with the Court that the City's purpose was to celebrate a public
holiday and that the effect of the display could not be interpreted as a message of
approval of religion. Id. at 691-92.
131. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
132. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 40. The statute at issue prescribed no particular
prayer, but allowed a teacher to announce a period of silence to be used for meditation and voluntary prayer. Id. at 40 n.2. A unanimous Supreme Court had earlier
invalidated a companion statute that allowed a teacher to lead willing students in
prayer and prescribed the prayer to be recited. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924
(1984). At the trial stage of this litigation, a third statute allowing for a moment of
silence to be used for meditation was held to be valid, and the issue was not raised
on appeal. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
133. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56. The Court found that the legislative purpose of
promoting and endorsing voluntary prayer in public schools was quite different from
protecting a student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during a moment "of silence. Id. at 59. The Court found it significant that the legislature enacted a statute
specifically mentioning prayer when it had already enacted a meditation statute
during which students were able to engage in prayer. Id. at 60.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 61. In his dissenting opinion in Jaffree, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the Court's rulings on the Establishment Clause were inconsistent with
the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine was faulty because of its reliance on a quotation from Thomas Jefferson regarding "a wall of separation between church and State." Id. at 91 (quoting Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). Justice Rehnquist emphasized the fact
that Jefferson was not present during the debate and ratification of the Bill of
Rights and that these words were written 14 years after the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued
that a proper historical grounding was found in James Madison's views, which the
Justice characterized as prohibiting only a national religion. Id. at 98. Justice
Rehnquist contended that Madison did not require governmental neutrality toward
religion. Id. Justice Rehnquist ended his overview of the debates on the Bill of
Rights with the contention that there was no historical basis for the Court's requirement of governmental neutrality toward religion. Id. at 106.
Next, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the idea of a "wall of separation,"
elevated to a constitutional principle in Everson, had led the Court into a jurisprudential morass of divided and imprecise opinions. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107 n.6
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In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,13
the Court considered the issue of whether two holiday displays
on public property violated the Establishment Clause." 7 At a
county courthouse, a religious group had erected a creche.' At
the entrance to a building housing city and county offices, the
city had erected a holiday display that included a Christmas
tree, a message from the mayor saluting liberty and a Chanukah
menorah." 9 The Court determined that the creche communicated a sectarian message because of the absence of secular symbols and the use of a religious slogan praising the birth of Jesus. 4 ' The Court held that the display violated the Establishment Clause because the government was sending an unmistakable message of endorsement of the Christian content of the display. 141
The second holiday display included a Christmas tree, a me-

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(allowing a State to lend geography textbooks to parochial school children) with
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that a State could not lend maps
for use in geography classes). Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(allowing a State to pay for public transportation to religious schools) with Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding that a State may not provide bus transportation for field trips to students enrolled in parochial schools). Compare Committee
for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 648 (1980) (holding that a State may pay
for the administration of state-written tests given in parochial schools) with Levitt v.
Committee for Public Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (prohibiting public funds for
teacher-prepared tests on secular topics given religious schools). Compare Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U:S. 306 (1952) (allowing public schools to release students during the
school day to attend religious instruction elsewhere) with Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U'S. 203 (1948) (prohibiting religious instruction in public
schools). Justice Rehnquist in Jaffree took aim at the Court's three-part test advanced in Lemon, which the Justice characterized as imprecise, overbroad, and historically deficient. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 108. Justice Rehnquist castigated the Court's
application of Lemon's entanglement prong, narrowly formulated in Walz, because it
could be applied to any contact between government and religious groups, including
universally accepted practices like fire code inspections of church buildings and state
regulation of religious schools regarding curriculum, attendance and certification of
teachers. Id. at 109-10.
136. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
137. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578.
138. Id. at 579. According to the Court, the creche depicted the scene shortly
after Jesus' birth in a manger in Bethlehem. Id. at 580. The creche included a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" Id.
139. Id. at 581-84. Chanukah, an eight-day Jewish holiday usually coinciding
with the Christmas holiday, commemorates the rededication of the Temple of Jerusalem after its recapture from the Greeks in 165 B.C. Id. at 582-83. Its central
ritual involves the lighting of the eight branches of the menorah. Id. at 583.
140. Id. at 598. The Court distinguished this display from that approved of in
Lynch, because the impact of the creche in Lynch was offset by its placement among
secular symbols of the Christmas holiday like Santa Claus, a Christmas tree, and
non-religious slogans like "Seasons Greetings." Id. at 596-98.
141. Id. at 600.
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norah and a sign saluting liberty.' The Court asserted that
the menorah was both a religious and secular symbol whose religious impact was diminished by its placement alongside a secular symbol of the Christian holiday.' The central question for
the Court was whether this display represented an endorsement
of both religions.'" The Court concluded that the display did
not have the effect of advancing religion, like the creche approved in Lynch, because the display only acknowledged the
secular status of the coinciding holidays without conveying a
message that the government supported either faith.'
In Lee v. Weisman, 48 the Court considered the issue of
whether a member of the clergy could deliver a non-sectarian
prayer at public high school graduation ceremonies. "' The
Court observed that the prayer reading coerced those students
objecting to the religious practice to participate in a state-sponsored religious activity. 14' The Court found that the practice
was sanctioned by the state, which controlled the content of the
prayer. 49 . Because the prayer was delivered in a public setting
with the support of the state, the Court reasoned that a student
who objected would be forced to participate in the religious exercise."o The Court held that the prayer exercises violated the
Establishment Clause because the state compelled attendance
and participation in a religious activity that an objecting student
could not avoid."'
142.

County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613-14.

143.

Id.

144. Id. at 616.
145. Id. at 620-21. The Court concluded that residents of the city could not
infer from the presence of the display that the city government was endorsing either
Christianity or Judaism. Id. The Court asserted that the constitutionality of the display must be judged from the perspective of the "reasonable observer." Id. (citing

Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
In County of Allegheny, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment that the
creche display was violative of the Establishment Clause and again advocated the
endorsement test. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

For Justice O'Connor, the creche sent a message to non-Christians that they were
not represented in the political community and that government endorsed Christianity. Id. at 626. Justice O'Connor maintained that the Establishment Clause made a
person's religious beliefs irrelevant to one's standing in the political community. Id.

at 627.
146. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
147. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2653.
148. Id. at 2655.149. Id. at 2656-57.
150. Id. at 2658-59.
151. Id. at 2661. In his concurring opinion in Lee, Justice Souter expounded on
two issues: whether a government practice that did not favor a particular religion
was constitutional, and whether state coercion was a necessary element implicating
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In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,5 ' the issue
the Court faced was whether federal funding53 used to provide
for an interpreter for a deaf student attending a Catholic school
was a violation of the Establishment Clause."M The Court
found two factors to be significant.' First, the aid and benefit
flowed directly to the handicapped child, and not to the religious
school, and second, the task of the interpreter was different from
that of a teacher because the interpreter did nothing more than
interpret the material presented in class.5 Because the federal law providing the funds created no incentive for a parent's
choice of a sectarian school, the Court held that the law was not
a violation of the Establishment Clause even though a religious
school received a slight financial benefit.'57
In reviewing the history of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it becomes evident that the Court
has faced troubling issues and created fine distinctions in its

the Clause. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring). As to the first issue,
Justice Souter insisted that precedent required that no distinction be made between
preferential and non-preferential endorsements of religion. Id. at 2667-68. Justice
Souter adhered to the principle that the Establishment Clause prohibited government
from supporting religion in general as well as a specific religious faith or group. Id.
Justice Souter found significance in the Framers adoption of the phrase "establishment of religion" after considering such narrow alternatives as establishment of
"a religion," "a national religion," or "one religious sect." Id. at 2669. Justice Souter
insisted that the adoption of the broader language indicated that the Framers understood their choice of the textual phrase to prohibit even non-preferential aid to religion. Id.
On the second issue, Justice Souter asserted that coercion was not a necessary element of Establishment Clause claims and that the Clause forbade non-coercive as well as coercive endorsements of religion. Id. at 2672. Justice Souter insisted
that to require coercion in establishment cases would render the Establishment
Clause superfluous, because any coercion of non-adherents to participate in a religious practice was by definition a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 2673.
152. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
153. The funding was made pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
154. Zabrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The interpreter was an employee of a public
school district and had accompanied the deaf child to class while attending public
school. Id. For the ninth grade, the child transferred to a Catholic school. Id.
The Court noted that religious groups had never been barred from receiving
the benefits of public programs. Id. at 2466. The Court asserted that it had never
invalidated a government program that provided benefits on a neutral basis to a
wide range of citizens just because religious groups received some of those benefits.
Id. (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) and Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)).
155. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
156. Id. The Court distinguished this case from two cases which invalidated
government programs that directly funded sectarian schools and relieved these
schools of significant costs. Id. (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)).
157. Zobrest. 113 S. Ct. at 2467-69.
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cases. The current Court includes a divergent majority,"5s
clinging to the general legal principles summarized in Lemon,
emasculated by its progeny159 and ignored in other cases,"e
and a committed minority declaiming America's religious tradition." 1 Kiryas Joel is symbolic of this tension. While the Lemon test itself has effectively been bypassed, a majority of the
Court adheres to its underlying principles, with Justice Souter
assuming a leading intellectual role on the issue. While the case
was correctly decided, the opinion in Kiryas Joel contains little
guidance for predicting the future course of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In the Kiryas Joel decision, the Court revealed disagreements
on the proper course to pursue in Establishment Clause cases.
In the majority are three differing positions," each representing a vision of how to address the shortcomings of the Lemon
test while remaining true to its underlying principles."3 The

158. Those concurring in the judgment in Kiryas Joel included Justices Souter,
Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at
2484. After the retirement of Justice Blackmun, Justice Breyer was appointed to the
Court beginning with the 1994-1995 term. Justice Breyer's position on the Establishment Clause is left to speculation.
159. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983). At issue in Kendrick was a federal law providing funds to private
organizations, some of which were religious in nature, for counseling services aimed
at addressing the social and economic problems associated with teenage sexuality
and pregnancy. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 597. Applying the Lemon test, the Court in
Kendrick held that the law did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 617. See
notes 118-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mueller.
160. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing the Nebraska State Legislature to
employ a chaplain and begin its sessions with a prayer); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228 (1982) (invalidating a state statute requiring a denomination collecting more
than 50% of its funds from non-members to register with the state's charitable organizations bureau).
161. Dissenting in Kiryas Joel were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. These positions can be found in the opinions of Justices Souter, O'Connor,
and Kennedy.
163. In Kiryas Joel, the Appellants structured their briefs around the proposition that Chapter 748 did not violate the Lemon test. See Appellants' Brief, Kiryas
Joel v. Grumet, 114'S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 and 93-539). Taking
note that Chapter 748 had failed the test in three state proceedings, the Appellants
asked that Lemon be overruled in the event that the Supreme Court agreed with
the New York Court of Appeals that Chapter 748 did not pass constitutional muster.
Appellant's Brief, at 45, Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 93-517).
The Appellees also based their brief on a Lemon analysis. See Appellee's
Brief, Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 and 93539). Significantly, the Kiryas Joel opinion cited Lemon only in passing, though part
of the opinion relied on Larkin v. Grendel's Den, which had applied the Lemon test.
Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-90. However, the principles underlying Lemon can be
detected in the competing positions of the Court's majority.
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dissenters in Kiryas Joel express a different opinion concerning

the fate of Lemon.
Justice Souter, author of the Court's opinion in Kiryas Joel,

had signaled his special interest in religion cases in his concurring opinions in Lee v. Weisman'" and Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah."s' In Lee, Justice Souter
discussed two points he considered fundamental in Establishment Clause cases: first, that all government aid to religious
groups, whether characterized as preferential or non-preferential, was impermissible; and second, that coercion was not required to sustain an Establishment Clause claim."' s In Justice
Souter's view, even the non-preferential endorsement of the idea
of religion was impermissible under the First Amendment.'67
In rejecting the coercion test with his second argument, Justice
Souter showed that the Court had invalidated statutes and practices even in the absence of coercion. 68
Justice O'Connor advocates the adoption of an endorsement
test to solve Establishment Clause issues. The test involves an
analysis of whether a reasonable person would interpret a state

164. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
165. 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (holding that a law
burdening religious practices that was neither neutral nor generally applicable was
unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state interest).
166. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2670-72 (Souter, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 2670.
168. Id. at 2671-73. Justice Souter set out his thinking on the accommodation
of religious practices under the Free Exercise Clause in his concurrence in Luhumi
Babalu. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter argued
that government had to accommodate religious exercise by granting exemptions
whenever a statute burdened religious practices in the absence of a compelling interest. Id. at 2241. Such a position recognizes the interplay between the religion clauses and allows government to respond to the religious needs of citizens. In Lukumi,
Justice Souter called for the re-examination of the Court's holding in Employment
Division v. Smith, which declared that a neutral law of general applicability that
burdened a religious practice did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990). At issue in Smith was a denial
of unemployment benefits to two members of the Native American Church who were
dismissed from their jobs for sacramental peyote use in violation of a state criminal
statute. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. In Lukumi, Justice Souter argued that Smith adopted a narrow conception of governmental neutrality toward religious free exercise in
contradistinction to the Court's previous jurisprudence. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2240
(Souter, J., concurring). Prior to Smith, the Court had held that facial neutrality
was not enough to validate a statute burdening free exercise and that the state had
to demonstrate a compelling interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (exempting Amish parents from a state law requiring children to attend
school until the age of sixteen). In Lukumi, Justice Souter asserted that the Free
Exercise Clause required a law to be substantively, as well as formally, neutral and
that when a facially neutral statute had the effect of burdening a religious practice,
the government was required to accommodate that practice by exempting it from the
statute. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2241 (Souter, J., concurring).
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action as conveying a message of endorsement or whether nonadherents would feel alienated from the political process." 9
Justice O'Connor also joined Justice Souter in suggesting that
the Establishment Clause could be violated in subtle, non-coercive ways. 7 '
A third approach to Establishment Clause cases is advocated
by Justice Kennedy, who signaled his support for a return to a
coercion test.17' Justice Kennedy concentrated on psychological
coercion as a required element in an Establishment Clause
"
case. 72
' While not abandoning completely the principles of
Lemon, Justice Kennedy has clearly stated that he has a different view than Justice Souter on the role of coercion in Establishment Clause cases, while sharply criticizing Justice O'Connor's
establishment test.'73 In his concurrence in Kiryas Joel, Justice
Kennedy maintained that Chapter 748 was violative of the Establishment Clause because it drew political boundaries on the
basis of a group's religious character. 7 4 Justice Kennedy appears more open to legislative accommodation than Justice
Souter, while recognizing the limits of such a remedy.
Finally, the Kiryas Joel dissenters adhere to a position advocating greater government support and accommodation of religion and religious groups under the Establishment Clause, arguing that such a position was consistent with the Framers' intent.
The dissenters contend that it was the intent of the Framers
that government merely prevent the establishment of a national
church, while expressing no preference among religious
groups."' In Kiryas Joel, the dissenters reiterated their adherence to a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause,

169. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627-28.
171. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In County of Allegheny, Justice Kennedy signaled his approval of the display including the nativity
scene on the theory that a non-adherent was not coerced to support a particular
religion and was free to ignore the display. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of Lee, see
notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
172. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy argued that the idea of coercion included
not only direct coercive measures like forcing a non-believer to financially support a
church but also a more subtle symbolic recognition of religious faith like the presence of a year-round religious display on government property. Id.
173. Id. at 668-69.
174. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
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one limiting its application to prohibiting the establishment of a
national religion and the preference of one sect over all others.
The Kiryas Joel dissenters advocate a complete repudiation of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence starting with
Everson. The dissenters' approach is flawed in two respects.
First, reliance on the record of the Framers' debates has not
revealed a clear picture of the Framers' intentions, allowing
opposing Justices to quote freely in support of incompatible
positions." 6 Second, adherence to the Framers' conception of
religion ignores the present reality of increased religious diversity."7 Today, the population of the United States is far more
diverse than the Framers could have imagined. The problems of
Establishment Clause cases arising today require an interpretation that reflects this heterogeneity.'
In sum, the positions represented in the Court's majority
share an adherence to the principles of the separation of church
and state, if not to the mechanical and vague Lemon test. Justice Souter's position offers the soundest approach to Establishment Clause cases because it recognizes that government has no
place meddling in religious affairs, except by granting judicial
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause. The real issue
presented in Kiryas Joel, that of providing federally funded
remedial services to children attending religious schools, would

176. This argument was first proposed by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion in Schempp. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan asserted that "[a] too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers
upon the issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected . . . . [Oln our
precise problem the historical record is at best ambiguous,-and statements can readily be found to support either side of the proposition." Id.
177. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 919-20 (1987). In 1791, the
United States was dominated by competing Protestant sects. See Schempp, 374 U.S.
at 240-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
178. A proper approach to the relationship between religion and government in
a secular, representative democracy is best exemplified by a quotation from the majority opinion in Schempp, written by Justice Clark:
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through
a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel
of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter
experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In
the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a
position of neutrality.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226. For example, in each of the school prayer cases, the
government had composed a banal, non-denominational prayer. This is certainly an
example of an " 'unhallowed 15erversion' by a civil magistrate." Everson, 370 U.S. at
432 (quoting James Madison, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298 (Robert A. Rutland
& William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969).
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have been more properly framed as one of free exercise, which
means that the Court must reconsider its decisions in Aguilar
and Ball. 7 ' As noted by Justice Souter in the majority opinion,
a solution could be fashioned that allowed teachers employed by
the public school district to provide these services at a neutral
site in the Village.8 0 The legislative approach to providing
these services, represented by Chapter 748, was a clear violation
of the Establishment Clause because the character of the school
district was defined by the Village boundaries, drawn to ensure
a closed religious community.'
The Court needs to clarify the concepts of accommodation and
neutrality and attempt to resolve the tension between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.182 Unfortunately, the decision in Kiryas Joel adds little to the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, other than revealing a wide
divergence of opinion on the direction of the Court on issues
more subtle than that presented here. However, the Court appears poised to strengthen its commitment, if not to the Lemon
test itself, then to its underlying principles, though predicting
the future course of the Court in this divisive area is problematic. The Court needs to harmonize the Religion Clauses to ensure
that religious organizations can flourish free of governmental
interference and endorsement, while guaranteeing that governmental actions do not hinder the free exercise and expression of
religious faith.
The United States was, and continues to be, a nation dominated by followers of the Christian faith. The myths and values of

179. See note 12 for a further discussion of the impact of Aguilar and Ball on
the present case.
180. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2493.
181. If there are any doubts about granting political authority to a religious
group, consider the following account of school board elections in Kiryas Joel:
As for the public school board, the first and only election was held in January
1990. A month earlier the Grand Rabbi said: "It's like this. With the power of
the Torah, I am here the Authority in the Rabbinical leadership. . . . As you
know I want to nominate seven people and I want these people to be the
people." When Joseph Waldman, a dissenting Satmar, tried to run without the
rabbi's permission, he was banished from the congregation; his six children
were expelled from the yeshiva; his tires were slashed; his windows were
broken; and several hundred people, including the rabbi, marched outside his
house chanting, "Death to Joseph Waldman!"
Jeffrey Rosen, Court Watch, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 11, 1994 at 11.
182. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992). Professor McConnell argues that accommodation of religion can occur under both clauses. Id. at 687. The
Constitution compels accommodation under "free exercise" and permits discretionary
accommodation under "establishment." Id. at 686-87.
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the Christian tradition suffuse American history and culture.
However, the United States Constitution requires that the nation conduct its political affairs outside of the area of Christian
faith. Otherwise, the political ideas that illuminate the Constitution, and the document itself, cannot survive a confrontation
with religious intolerance and factionalism.
CharlesB. Schweitzer

